PC: Response to Critics by Gage, Logan Paul & McAllister, Blake
98
PC: Response to Critics
Logan Paul Gage and Blake McAllister
We thank the other contributors for raising several important objections to 
the PC approach to religious epistemology. They raise far too many issues 
for us to cover each in detail. Hence, we will limit ourselves to five key 
objections:  (1) McNabb worries that PC requires an awareness of natural 
theology for most adults; (2) Baldwin worries that seemings can’t be ultimate 
justifiers; (3) DePoe worries that PC is far too liberal and even allows stray 
hunches to be justified; (4) DePoe further worries that PC has a circularity 
problem; and (5) Oliphint, Baldwin, and DePoe all worry that PC doesn’t 
have the right sort of connection to the truth. In what follows, we discuss 
each critique of PC in order.
The Natural Theology Objection
First, we argued that, while seemings provisionally justify beliefs, most 
adult theists in our culture encounter potential defeaters to their theistic 
seemings. For this reason, they will need to form a broader worldview in 
which, say, evil and religious disagreement make sense if they are to have 
robust justification for their beliefs. Tyler McNabb worries, however, that 
PC requires more of ordinary theists than is necessary. He thinks that our 
design plan is such that most serious believers will have strong theistic 
seemings that completely overwhelm potential defeaters. (To compare, you 
would likely dismiss out of hand any argument that purported to show that 
you do not exist.) So theists won’t have to rely on the support of a broader 
worldview to dismiss potential defeaters.
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In reply, we disagree about the strength of our initial theistic seemings. If 
a boy goes to church camp and it seems to him that God exists, that seeming, 
in and of itself, is probably not going to be strong enough to deflect all 
challenges for the rest of his life. Nor is that how it seems to work for most 
believers. For instance, the boy will, at some point, begin to question where 
this seeming came from and whether it was veridical. If he cannot assure 
himself that this seeming was a part of God’s self-revelation, then he will 
have a defeater.
That said, we agree that most mature theists, once assured in their 
faith, will have robust theistic seemings. Such assurance is not a brute 
feature of their design plan, however, but stems from their broad range of 
evidence: having thought about the world, having grown closer to God in 
prayer, from hearing an apologetics lecture at church, from talking to other 
believers about the ways God redeems suffering, from witnessing God’s 
transformative power in their own lives, and so on. Whether they realize it 
or not, they’ve built up a host of auxiliary beliefs that reinforce their theistic 
commitments and neutralize the defeaters they encounter. So we think that 
McNabb doesn’t give ordinary theists enough credit.
Perhaps McNabb thinks that our approach requires most theists to rely 
on the formal arguments of natural theology. If this is the objection, let us 
state clearly that this is not so. We think ordinary people require broader 
worldviews to deflect potential defeaters, and that such worldviews can 
provide additional support for theism because the world as they see it 
becomes inexplicable without God. But we do not think theists need to 
be able to state formal arguments. There is a whole lot of ground between 
relying on random hunches and knowing Plantinga’s modal ontological 
argument. Ordinary people, we suggest, have reasons that fall in between 
these categories—reasons that tend to make their religious beliefs reasonable.
The Seemings Aren’t Ultimate 
Objection
Second, Erik Baldwin argues that seemings cannot be epistemically ultimate, 
bedrock, or foundational, as we claim. As we see things, our beliefs typically 
stem out of experiences we call “seemings.” If you think about why you 
believe what you believe, you eventually trace your belief back to the fact 
that the world appears to you to be a certain way. So seemings, for us, are 
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ultimate in some sense. Baldwin appears to think, however, that this means 
that on PC seemings can’t be questioned—that we can’t consider whether 
our seemings are truth-oriented or misleading.
But this is not the case. We must distinguish prima facie justification from 
ultima facie justification. We have only argued that seemings lend prima 
facie justification to one’s beliefs. Seemings may certainly be questioned. 
They aren’t fundamental in the sense of being unquestionable. When 
defeaters arise, for instance, we can and do question our initial appearances. 
This is what makes PC a version of moderate/modest foundationalism; the 
foundations need not be certain or indubitable, as Descartes would have 
it, but are open to question. The typical theist, as we suggested above, will 
encounter reasons to question his or her seemings. To obtain ultima facie 
justification, the totality of the theist’s evidence must support theism. This 
will likely require a larger theistic belief system to address potential defeaters 
(a belief system that will be profoundly shaped by one’s tradition).1
The Crazy Liberal Objection
Third, John DePoe chastises the PC view for being far too liberal. Even a 
stray hunch, DePoe claims, would be capable of justifying a guilty verdict in 
a court of law.2 In response, note that normal adults have learned over many 
years how to tell the difference between a stray hunch and a reasonable 
judgment based on an overall impression of the world—even when they 
can’t articulate all the features of the world that prompted the seeming. One 
need not be an epistemologist to notice that a seeming is out of the blue. 
It is psychologically implausible to us that people have the sort of random 
seemings DePoe describes with any regularity. We certainly don’t. And 
those who do are likely to immediately recognize the seeming as a stray 
hunch. At any rate, it is implausible that such seemings would be of any 
strength, and thus would only lend the weakest support to any attendant 
belief.
Moreover, our claim is only that seemings increase one’s rational support 
for believing a proposition in the absence of defeaters. While many worry 
that PC makes it too easy to gain evidence for dubious propositions, notice 
that PC also makes it extremely easy to gain evidence against dubious 
propositions. One has a weak seeming that some strange proposition is true; 
and then it immediately seems to one that this is no better than a strange 
hunch, and the seeming is defeated (counterbalanced, if not outweighed).
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Consider also that we all have a great deal of experience with our own 
cognitive faculties—enough to know that we are in no position to have 
reliable seemings about the date that a certain tree was planted just by 
looking at it.3 We know we possess no track record of success about such 
propositions and would naturally distrust any such seemings—seemings 
that, as we said above, we’ve certainly never experienced. Typical human 
beings are cautious about radically new or foreign experiences. We could say 
something similar about the juror who has a gut feeling that the defendant 
is guilty. We all know that such gut impressions are not reliable enough 
to place the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and it would be 
completely unreasonable for the juror to ignore such considerations. For 
this reason, we think the worry that PC allows nearly any proposition to 
be justified is off base, both because it posits hosts of strange seemings that 
we think ordinary people lack and because if ordinary people had such 
seemings they’d also possess defeaters. These supposed counterexamples to 
PC have whatever force they do precisely because all cognitively unimpaired 
adults immediately recognize the seeming as bizarre. In other words, 
typical persons would find such seemings bizarre given their background 
information and discount them for that reason.4 We’ve now been accused by 
McNabb of being too demanding and by DePoe of being too liberal. Perhaps 
we truly have the Goldilocks view.
The Conceptual Circularity Objection
Fourth, DePoe also argues that PC provides a circular definition of epistemic 
justification. DePoe is incorrect for the simple reason that PC doesn’t provide 
any definition of justification at all! PC merely states a sufficient condition 
for when a proposition has prima facie justification. PC does not claim that 
what it is for a proposition to be justified just is for that proposition to seem 
true and lack defeaters. Indeed, almost all proponents of PC, including 
ourselves, acknowledge other ways in which a proposition can be justified—
for instance, through the inferential support provided by arguments. Thus, 
we have some prior understanding of justification in mind when we assert 
PC. Taking a closer look at that understanding of justification will clear up 
any remaining worries about conceptual circularity.
Justification, as we are conceiving of it, belongs to those propositions 
that one is permitted to believe given all that is indicated to be true from 
within one’s first-person perspective.5 On this approach, evidence for p can 
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be understood as something that indicates the truth of p to the subject. Thus, 
a proposition is justified for a subject if it is permissible to believe given all 
of that person’s evidence. When this is the case, we say that the proposition 
is “on-balance” indicated to be true for the subject.
On this framework, the heart of PC is just this:  when p seems true to 
somebody, that person thereby has some indication of p’s truth. Even more 
simply, seemings indicate the truth of their content—the stronger the 
seeming, the more strongly the content is indicated to be true. It follows 
that, if p seems true, then p will be on-balance indicated to be true unless 
there is something in one’s broader evidence to counter this. PC captures this 
implication by saying that p is justified in the absence of defeaters. We chose 
to frame PC in these terms to remain consonant with the literature and to 
make explicit the tie between having evidence for p and having justification 
for p, but perhaps it would be helpful to formulate it differently. We have 
done so in our other work. There we defended the following principles, 
which we take to be equivalent:
PCR If it seems true to S that p, then S thereby has pro tanto good reason to 
believe p.
PCE If it seems true to S that p, then S thereby has some evidence for p (the 
strength of that evidence being proportional to the strength of the seeming).
When laid out in this way, it should be especially plain that PC does not 
suffer from any kind of conceptual circularity vis-à-vis justification.
The Truth Connection Objection
Lastly, in perhaps the most serious challenge to PC, Oliphint, Baldwin, and 
DePoe all worry that the PC approach to religious epistemology does not 
contain a tight enough connection to the truth. The worry is that something 
can be justified in the sense that we have described and yet still be false. 
Indeed, you can be justified in our sense and still be way off the mark. In 
prehistoric times, for instance, people might have been justified in believing 
that the earth was flat, even though this isn’t even close to the truth. Our 
critics seem to think that this constitutes an objection to our approach. 
It’s not. Justification, properly understood, doesn’t intend to provide any 
guarantee of truth or objective reliability. There are other positive epistemic 
statuses, like warrant, which concern themselves with guarantees of 
objective reliability. But the fact that justification is different from warrant is 
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no objection. Nor does our choice to focus on justification suggest any lack 
of affection for truth. As we’ll explain below, the love of truth should lead 
one to focus on justification. Before we get there, however, we must say more 
about the history of justification and its connection to truth. This will better 
position us to see why criticisms of this sort are misguided.
On our reading of the history, justification has always been—at least since 
the Early Modern period—about having good evidence. To be justified in 
believing something, the subject needs to have some on-balance indication 
that it is true. The evidence, moreover, cannot just be “out there”; it needs to 
be present within the subject’s first-person perspective. Anything less was 
considered improper, irresponsible, a violation of one’s epistemic duties in 
the pursuit of truth. A standard assumption accompanied this conception 
of justification:
The Objective Connection to Truth—Necessarily, a justified belief is true or, at 
least, objectively reliable.
That is, following your evidence was thought to guarantee the reliability of 
your belief. Descartes went so far as to say that, so long as one carefully 
followed the evidence, one could never be mistaken!
Alas, Descartes was wrong. All of your current evidence (for things 
beyond the incorrigible) is logically compatible with any number of 
skeptical scenarios, such as the possibility that you are being deceived by 
an evil demon. And if you are in such a skeptical scenario, then your beliefs 
will neither be true nor objectively reliable (see our critique of DePoe for an 
example). It follows that no matter how carefully you follow your evidence, 
you can still be in error—gross error, in fact. In order for you to reach the 
truth, the world has to cooperate.
Thus, it turned out that the assumption accompanying justification 
was false. Justification does not guarantee that one’s beliefs are objectively 
reliable. It is no objection to PC, then, that seemings can be misleading. 
Evidence can be misleading. Justification, history has taught us, just doesn’t 
come with guarantees of truth.
Why, then, should we pay any attention to justification if it doesn’t 
guarantee truth or even reliability? We want the truth, right? The answer 
is that following your evidence is the only sensible way of pursuing the 
truth. There’s really no other option for fallible agents such as ourselves who, 
unfortunately, cannot snap our fingers and arrive at the correct answer. Take 
a situation in which all of your evidence points strongly toward p. What 
tolerable option is there but to believe p? Your alternatives are to disbelieve 
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p or to place the odds at 50–50—a stance sometimes called “withholding 
assent”—and neither of those makes any sense for someone who cares about 
securing the truth.
Thus, we see that being justified is about putting forth your best efforts 
in the pursuit of truth—about doing the best you can with the information 
available to you. This is really all you can do. You have no control over 
whether you live in an evil demon world or not and, hence, no control over 
whether your beliefs are reliable. All you can do is align your beliefs with 
that which your evidence indicates to be true.
Now, those called “externalists” have taken up the search for a positive 
epistemic status that can replace justification in providing the objective 
connection to truth. Unfortunately, some of these efforts have continued to 
use the term “justification” to describe this new epistemic status, though it 
bears little resemblance to justification as conceived throughout the Western 
tradition. Some, like Plantinga (and McNabb), have labeled the object of 
their search “warrant” rather than appropriating the term “justification” 
(much to our satisfaction). We do not disparage investigations into the 
nature of warrant. We want our beliefs to be warranted as well as justified. 
But notice that you do not have any direct control over whether your beliefs 
are warranted. No effort on your part can guarantee the reliability of your 
faculties. The only thing that is within your control is to take those actions 
that, given the evidence available to you, will maximize the chance that your 
beliefs are warranted. Justification, once again, proves indispensable.
To drive the point home, we might ask our critics why they hold the 
positions that they do. The answer had better be because that is the position 
that our evidence indicates to be true. If that’s not the case—if their evidence 
points to the falsity of their own position or has nothing to say one way or 
the other—then they have no business believing it! If they really care about 
truth (as they all undoubtedly do), then they will be concerned to only 
believe those things that are indicated to be true by their evidence. Thus, 
every lover of truth should care about justification, even if justification does 
not guarantee success.
Conclusion
When the true nature of justification is made plain—when we see that it is 
about doing the best you can with the information available to you and not 
about guaranteeing success—PC becomes increasingly apparent. Of course 
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appearances can be misleading. But what else are you supposed to do but 
follow them? We made this argument in our main essay. There we pointed 
out that if p seems true and you have absolutely no reason to doubt this, then 
it seems permissible to believe that p.
We extended the argument by looking at the alternatives. If you demand 
prior verification of everything that seems true, you’re going to end up in 
complete skepticism. But if you can, at least some of the time, trust what 
seems to be the case without any prior verification, why would you not be 
entitled to do so all of the time? It would be arbitrary to extend the benefit 
of the doubt to some seemings but not others when, from the inside, there 
is no difference that could license such disparate treatment. Add to this the 
worry that, if you only give the benefit of the doubt to a limited number of 
seemings, you will once again end up in radical skepticism.
This argument was not contested by our critics. (Is it too optimistic 
to think that they found it exceedingly plausible?) Whatever the reason, 
the fact is that our main case for PC remains intact and unchallenged. 
Furthermore, we have shown above that none of the objections raised by 
our critics provides a strong reason to doubt the truth of PC. All considered, 
then, the evidence still points toward PC. And what else can you do but 
follow the evidence?
Notes
 1. We think traditions have an indirect influence on what is reasonable to
believe. They exert indirect influence by affecting how things seem to us;
and how things seem to us, in accordance with tradition-transcendent
standards, directly determines what we are justified in believing. For more,
see our critique of Baldwin.
 2. Most attorneys say that a guilty verdict requires >95% certainty of the
defendant’s guilt.
 3. See Peter Markie, “The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification,”
Philosophical Studies 126, no. 3 (2005): 357.
 4. Purported counterexamples to PC often just stipulate that the subject with
the crazy seeming lacks defeaters. But once we are thinking about a subject
that doesn’t have any of the information normal adults have, it should no
longer be obvious that the proposition that is crazy or unjustified relative to
their information. See, for instance, the “Jod” example in Michael Tooley,
“Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism,” in
Seemings and Justification:  New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal
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Conservatism, ed. Christopher Tucker (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2013), 320.
 5. Or, alternatively, those propositions that fit with what is indicated to
be true. Internalists are split over whether to characterize justification
deontologically, in terms of epistemic duties, or using a nondeontological
notion of fittingness. We stick to deontological terminology for simplicity,
but we wish to remain neutral on that debate here.
